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Summary
Interactions with conspecifics are key to any social species. In order to navigate this social world, 
it is crucial for individuals to learn from and about others. Whether it is learning a new skill by 
observing a parent perform it, avoiding negative outcomes, or making complex collective 
decisions, understanding the mechanisms underlying such social cognitive processes has been of 
considerable interest to psychologists and neuroscientists, particularly to studies of learning and 
decision-making. Here, we review studies that have used computational modelling techniques, 
combined with neuroimaging, to shed light on how people learn and make decisions in social 
contexts. As opposed to previous methods used in social neuroscience studies, the computational 
approach allows one to directly examine where in the brain particular computations, as estimated 
by models of behavior, are implemented. Similar to studies of experiential learning, findings 
suggest that learning from others can be implemented using several strategies: vicarious reward 
learning, where one learns from observing the reward outcomes of another agent; action imitation, 
which relies on encoding a prediction error between the expected and actual actions of the other 
agent; and social inference, where one learns by inferring the goals and intentions of others. These 
strategies rely on distinct neural networks, which may be recruited adaptively depending on task 
demands, the environment and other social factors.
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Introduction
Over the past decade, many cognitive neuroscience studies, particularly in the field of 
learning and decision-making, have used a combination of computational modelling of 
behavior together with neuroimaging. Internal variables, such as reward prediction errors or 
subjective values, often cannot be directly measured from the task design, but instead have 
to be extracted from a computational model estimated from participants’ behavior. These 
variables or model parameters can in turn be regressed against a measure of brain activity 
during task performance, such as the fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) BOLD 
(blood oxygen level-dependent) signal, giving insights into whether and where in the brain 
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these variables are computed (Cohen et al., 2017; Corrado & Doya, 2007; J. P. O’Doherty, 
Hampton, & Kim, 2007; John P O’Doherty, Dayan, Friston, Critchley, & Dolan, 2003).
More recently, this type of computational or model-based neuroimaging experiments have 
been conducted in the social domain, to better understand the signals computed by the brain 
during social interactions. In this review, we outline several approaches that have been taken 
to examine social neuroscience from a computational perspective. We focus on two aspects 
of the social cognition literature: (i) how people learn from observing others as well as the 
application to strategic interactions, and (ii) how people learn about other people’s 
preferences and make collective decisions.
Learning FROM others
It is crucial for humans and other animals to learn about the world around them in order to 
make adaptive decisions, obtain rewards and avoid punishments. These ‘objective’ values of 
decision variables can be learned experientially, by trial and error. In social species however, 
there are many situations where one can learn by observing the behavior of another 
individual. Such observational learning can be clearly advantageous as it allows an 
individual to assess the consequences of actions available in the environment without 
directly experiencing these potentially negative or threatening outcomes. Current theories 
suggest that three strategies are at play in this process (Dunne & O’Doherty, 2013): 
vicarious reinforcement-learning, action imitation, and inference about others’ beliefs and 
intentions (Figure 1). It is worth noting that this distinction, at least between action imitation 
and inference over others, has been discussed at length in developmental and comparative 
psychology - also referred to as ‘imitation versus emulation’ distinction (Horner & Whiten, 
2005; Nielsen, 2006; Thompson & Russell, 2004; Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & 
Hopper, 2009).
Three observational learning strategies with distinct computational and neural signatures
In vicarious reinforcement-learning, an individual learns from observing someone else 
experiencing outcomes, rather than experiencing outcomes by themselves. Similar to 
experiential learning, associations between the actions taken and the outcomes experienced 
by another agent can be learned to inform the observer of the different action values. These 
associations can then act as a guide for the observer’s actions. Computational mechanisms 
of such forms of observational learning involve computing a prediction error about the other 
agent’s outcome, i.e. the difference between the other agent’s predicted and actual outcome 
(Burke, Tobler, Baddeley, & Schultz, 2010; Cooper, Dunne, Furey, & O’Doherty, 2012; M. 
R. Hill, Boorman, & Fried, 2016; Suzuki et al., 2012). These observational reward 
prediction errors (oRPE) have been found to be encoded in the brain, in particular in the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC; Burke, Tobler, Baddeley, & Schultz, 2010; Suzuki 
et al., 2012) and in the dorsal striatum (Cooper et al., 2012) in fMRI studies. A single-unit 
recording study in humans recently reported the encoding of observational RPEs at the 
single neuron level in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; Hill, Boorman, & Fried, 
2016). These neural signals are partly shared with the encoding of experiential RPEs in 
dopaminergic regions of the striatum and projections to the vmPFC (Behrens, Hunt, 
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Woolrich, & Rushworth, 2008; Daw & Doya, 2006; Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008). 
The value of rewards obtained by others, as well as predictions about these rewards (i.e. the 
expected value) have also been found to be encoded in the brain, particularly in the ACC 
(Apps & Ramnani, 2014; Lockwood, Apps, Roiser, & Viding, 2015). Collectively, these 
findings suggest that vicarious reinforcement-learning is implemented in the brain and that 
this mechanism depends on neural circuits that at least partially overlap with those involved 
in experiential learning.
A second observational learning mechanism, action imitation, involves learning from 
observing another person’s actions. In imitation learning, an observer learns to take a 
particular action based on the extent to which the other agent took that same action in the 
past and in the same context. This action imitation strategy can also be explained in a 
reinforcement-learning framework, whereby actions performed by the other agent are 
reinforced positively, while unchosen actions are reinforced negatively, leading to the 
computation of action values that can then be used by the observer. Action prediction errors 
– the difference between the action performed by another agent and the action that was 
expected of them by the observer – have been reported in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(dlPFC), dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), and bilateral inferior parietal lobule 
(Burke et al., 2010; Suzuki et al., 2012). While not being too computationally demanding, 
action imitation can be especially advantageous in situations where the other agent’s 
outcomes are not available for the observer to see. At the level of neuronal implementation, 
it is possible that action imitation is implemented in part through mirror neurons, which have 
been found to fire when an individual performs an action but also observes another person 
performing the same action (Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 2009; Lametti & Watkins, 2016; 
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996). This imitation 
strategy involves some level of trust that the other person’s actions are correct. In case of 
distrust, the same strategy can result in “reverse” action imitation, whereby the observer 
chooses the opposite action from that of the other agent. Other variables likely to modulate 
imitation learning could then include factors such as how well the observer knows the agent, 
how reliable the agent’s actions are, or whether the agent has a competitive interest.
Finally, a last strategy for observational learning involves a more complex inference process 
about other agents’ intentions and hidden mental states. In such a strategy, an individual 
updates their beliefs about others’ goals and intentions in a Bayesian manner, combining 
their prior beliefs with evidence they get from observing others’ actions and/or outcomes. A 
mechanism that has been put forward to implement this strategy is inverse reinforcement-
learning or inverse RL (Collette, Pauli, Bossaerts, & O’Doherty, 2017; Ng & Russell, 2000). 
Contrary to classical RL, in which an individual learns the value of an action from observing 
the rewards, in inverse RL an individual infers the reward distribution from observing the 
actions of another agent. In another study, a hierarchical Bayesian learning model best 
explained how people infer the intentions of others. In this model the observer learns about 
the volatility of the partner’s intentions in order to optimize his/her own predictions about 
the validity of the partner’s advice (Diaconescu et al., 2014). Interestingly, brain activity 
tracking these social inference computations was found in regions that are known to be part 
of the mentalizing and Theory of Mind network: dmPFC (Boorman, O’Doherty, Adolphs, & 
Rangel, 2013; Collette et al., 2017; Hampton, Bossaerts, & O’Doherty, 2008), 
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temporoparietal junction (TPJ; Behrens, Hunt, Woolrich, & Rushworth, 2008; Boorman, 
O’Doherty, Adolphs, & Rangel, 2013) and posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS; 
Hampton, Bossaerts, & O’Doherty, 2008). These regions were originally identified with 
non-computational approaches in a range of social inference tasks (Fletcher et al., 1995; 
Frith & Frith, 2006; Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Van Overwalle & 
Baetens, 2009). Overall, a neurocomputational approach to social inference during 
observational learning has helped providing a mechanistic account of Theory of Mind – the 
ability to attribute mental states and intentions to others. It also provides a global framework 
in which the observer can also take into account the possibility that the agent they are 
observing has different preferences, goals and intentions from their own, or a competing 
agenda.
An empirical question that remains to be examined in more detail is how much of these 
computations and circuits involved in observational learning strategies overlap with those of 
experiential reinforcement-learning, when an individual learns by directly experiencing 
outcomes. Extensive work points towards two major strategies underlying experiential 
learning: model-free or stimulus-driven learning, as well as model-based or goal-directed 
learning (Balleine & Dickinson, 1998; Daw, Gershman, Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan, 2011; 
Dickinson, 1985; John P. O’Doherty, Cockburn, & Pauli, 2017). A parallel could be drawn 
between the experiential and the social domains, whereby vicarious RL and action imitation 
RL could be considered model-free strategies, while social inference could constitute a 
model-based strategy, requiring the observer to build a model of world and to learn 
probability distributions of another agent’s goals and transition between states (Dunne, 
D’Souza, & O’Doherty, 2016). However, neuroimaging results involving areas such as the 
TPJ, pSTS or dmPFC in social inference learning, which are not typically involved in 
model-based experiential learning, suggest that this parallel may be too simplistic. Even 
though the computations underlying social inference learning may fit the description of 
‘model-based’ computations, the neural circuits recruited in the social domain seem to be 
distinct from those implementing model-based computations during experiential learning. 
More empirical evidence is needed to investigate how much overlap there is between the 
circuits for social and experiential learning and whether and how exactly the computations 
implemented by these circuits differ.
Application to strategic and competitive interactions
Many social interactions involve a strategic or competitive component (e.g. games), such 
that an individual has an incentive to exploit the knowledge they learn from their opponent, 
by relying on recursive beliefs about the opponent’s intentions (e.g. “I think that he thinks 
that I think…”). These beliefs are acquired through learning from previous interactions with 
that opponent (for a detailed review, see Lee & Seo, 2016). People in such interactions can 
even have an incentive to lie or purposefully deceive each other, and therefore to detect these 
deceptive strategies in their opponents. The study of strategy in social neuroscience has 
tended to utilize concepts and tasks from behavioral game theory (Camerer, 2003). Many 
studies have now developed computational models combined with neuroimaging to explain 
these strategic social interactions and how they are implemented in the brain.
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For example, in a study using the trust game, in which an individual learns about another 
person’s reputation and trust in a two-person economic exchange, activity in the dorsal 
striatum was found to predict reciprocity or ‘intention to trust’ in the game (King-Casas et 
al., 2005). In a recent study, participants had to learn about the trustworthiness of several 
partners and then decide to play with strangers who look more or less like the original 
partners (FeldmanHall et al., 2018). Amygdala tracked resemblance to untrustworthy 
partners, dmPFC tracked resemblance to trustworthy partners, and dorsal striatum (caudate) 
activation patterns supported the decision to trust new players. In another study (Hampton et 
al., 2008), pairs of participants played the inspector game, a variant of the competitive game 
‘matching pennies’. In this game one participant is an employer who can inspect or not 
inspect and the other an employee or can work or shirk. Both participants have different 
interests, such that the employee has an incentive to shirk if not being inspected, or to work 
if inspected; in contrast the employer’s preference is to not inspect while the employee is 
working. Therefore, both participants have to try and predict what the other player’s next 
action will be in order to choose the best action for themselves. The computational model 
that best explains participants’ behavior consists of an algorithm that iteratively updates the 
probability of the opponent’s action based on their previous actions, combined with a 
second-order mental state representation (i.e. an effect of the opponent’s predictions on the 
participant’s actions). Different components of this computational model were tracked by 
different neural substrates in the brain. The mPFC was found to incorporate second-order 
knowledge by tracking an individual’s expectations given the degree of model-predicted 
influence from the opponent. The pSTS tracked a signal used to update the second-order 
knowledge representation once the opponent’s action is observed. A recent replication and 
extension of this work used theta-burst transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), to provide 
evidence for a causal influence of the rTPJ on mentalizing and integration of other people’s 
beliefs during strategic social behavior (Hill et al., 2017).
Another strategic learning task which was used in combination with computational 
modelling and fMRI is a stag-hunt game, in which participants interact with a computerized 
agent using different levels of recursive inferences (sophistication). In the game, the 
participant and the computerized agent are hunters who can either individually hunt a rabbit 
for a small payoff, or collaborate to hunt a stag for a large payoff. A computational model of 
dynamic belief inference (Yoshida, Dolan, & Friston, 2008) was fit to the behavioral data. At 
the neural level, computations reflecting the uncertainty of the inference about the other 
agent’s strategy were found in the dmPFC, while the estimated sophistication level (or depth 
of recursion) of the participant’s strategy was encoded in the left dlPFC (Yoshida, Seymour, 
Friston, & Dolan, 2010). Involvement of the dmPFC in tracking an opponent’s or partner’s 
belief during strategic interaction was confirmed by electrophysiological recording of 
dmPFC neurons in non-human primates, who were found to engage in recursive learning 
and counter predictable exploitation by their opponent (Seo, Cai, Donahue, & Lee, 2014). 
Neurons in the dmPFC represented the animal’s recent choice and reward history, as well as 
a switching signals that correlated with the animal’s tendency to deviate from simple 
heuristic learning.
In a multi-strategy competitive learning task called the ‘patent race game’, a hybrid model 
integrating both RL and social belief inference best explained behavior (Zhu, Mathewson, & 
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Hsu, 2012). Ventral striatum was found to track both an RL prediction error – the difference 
between expected and actual payoffs given the chosen strategy – and a belief-based 
prediction error – the difference between expected and actual payoffs taking into account all 
possible strategies weighted by the beliefs about future actions of opponents. Interestingly, 
the rostral ACC exclusively encoded the belief prediction error, in a way that correlated with 
individual difference in the engagement of belief learning.
Finally, in a recent study (Hertz et al., 2017), the authors investigated the neural 
computations associated with the source of social influence during advice giving. The 
strategic aspect of the task is such that two advisers, one of which is the participant, compete 
for influence over a ‘client’. Theory of mind regions were again associated with different 
components of behavior. Activity in the rTPJ was found to be involved in tracking whether 
the client chose them or not, which was argued to play a role in determining strategic 
influence over the client accordingly; while accuracy relative to the other adviser was found 
to be encoded in the mPFC.
These studies suggest that the same brain areas involved in learning from another agent by 
inferring their beliefs and intentions, mainly dmPFC, pSTS and rTPJ, can also perform these 
computations in strategic and competitive contexts. Several other sophisticated 
computational models of mentalizing and recursive belief inference have been put forward to 
explain strategic social interactions between people (Devaine, Hollard, & Daunizeau, 2014; 
Hula, Montague, & Dayan, 2015; Hula, Vilares, Lohrenz, Dayan, & Montague, 2018; Xiang, 
Ray, Lohrenz, Dayan, & Montague, 2012) and to predict sequential actions in complex 
environments (Baker, Jara-Ettinger, Saxe, & Tenenbaum, 2017); however, the neural bases 
of these computations have yet to be fully examined using model-based fMRI.
Learning ABOUT others
So far we have described computational strategies that people use to learn from other 
people’s actions, outcomes, beliefs and intentions, in order to perform a task correctly by 
themselves. However, in many situations, we also learn about others. This type of learning 
usually involves learning about subjective values and preferences of another person or a 
group, in a context where there is no right or wrong decision, but instead a desire to 
understand others and possibly ‘fit in’ with the group. Whether people know it or not, what 
they learn about others can influence their own preferences and decisions and can help a 
group reach a consensus. In this part, we present literature that has shed light on the neural 
computations underlying these processes.
Learning about other people’s attitudes and abilities
The neurocomputational mechanisms by which people learn about others have been 
examined in several recent studies. In Boorman et al. (2013), participants have to evaluate 
the expertise of other people as compared to that of algorithms in predicting the value of 
hypothetical assets. Model-based computations characterized subjects’ behavior such that 
individuals credit people who agree with them more than equivalent algorithms when their 
predictions are correct, and penalize them less when they are incorrect. Beliefs about the 
expertise of other people and algorithms were represented and updated in the mentalizing 
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network (mPFC, ACC, TPJ, precuneus), while behavioral differences between learning 
about people relative to algorithms were reflected in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) 
and mPFC. In another study (Wittmann et al., 2016), participants played a reaction-time 
game in which they had to learn about other people’s ability as well as estimate their own 
ability, both in cooperative and competitive social contexts. Given self and other 
performance history, a computational RL framework was used to model participants’ 
estimates of self- and other-performance. At the neural level, effects were found in the 
dmPFC, which tracked two components of the model: others’ estimated performance, as 
well as self-performance in ‘compete’ relative to ‘cooperate’ contexts.
In addition to learning about other people’s expertise and ability in performing a task, 
individuals often learn about the preferences or subjective values of their peers. For example, 
in a social version of a temporal discounting task, participants learned about another 
person’s subjective values and discounting rate (Garvert, Moutoussis, Kurth-Nelson, 
Behrens, & Dolan, 2015). Using fMRI repetition suppression, the authors showed that 
learning about another agent’s subjective values induce plasticity in the mPFC. This 
plasticity is in turn explained by a striatal prediction error signal encoding the difference 
between self and other’s values. The mPFC has also found to be involved in social hierarchy 
learning (Kumaran, Banino, Blundell, Hassabis, & Dayan, 2016). In this task participants 
had to learn a hierarchy of nine people within a company, including either themselves or a 
friend. Learning behavior was better explained by a Bayesian inference scheme than by an 
RL model. Knowledge about one own’s hierarchy, as opposed to that of a friend, was found 
to be selectively updated in the mPFC. Domain-general learning of other people’s relative 
status within a hierarchy was mediated by learning signals in the amygdala and 
hippocampus.
A situation in which it is key to be able to learn about other people’s preferences is when an 
individual has to make a decision on behalf of someone else. In Nicolle et al. (2012), the 
authors tested this using an intertemporal choice task in which participants sometimes 
choose for themselves and sometimes for someone else. Depending on which choice was 
relevant for the task, neural signals reflecting self-choice versus other-choice encoding were 
inter-changeable between the vmPFC and the dmPFC. The choice that needed to be 
executed was represented in the vmPFC, while the non-executed choice (i.e. the other 
person’s preference when I choose for myself, or my choice when I choose for the other 
person) was reflected in the dmPFC. In another study, magnetoencephalography (MEG) was 
used during a learning task to identify how learning signals are attributed to oneself versus 
another agent. The representation of prediction errors in the brain showed separate signals 
depending on the identity of the agent being learned about, consistent with a ‘neural self-
other distinction’ (Ereira, Dolan, & Kurth-Nelson, 2018).
Finally, a recent study developed a computational model of how people learn about other 
people’s prudence, impatience, or laziness, in a task that involves observing another agent’s 
cost-benefits decisions between a low-cost/low-reward option and a high-cost/high-reward 
option before the participant makes their own decision (Devaine & Daunizeau, 2017). There 
were three cost types associated with the three attitudes mentioned above: delay 
(impatience), effort (laziness) and risk (prudence). The computational model, based on 
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Bayes-optimal information processing principles, correctly predicted two biases that arise 
when individuals learn about others’ attitudes. First, people overestimate the degree to which 
their preferences are similar to others (social projection bias) and second, they align their 
decisions with those of others (social influence bias). Another recent study provided more 
evidence and a computational account of the social projection bias, showing that people’s 
own priors influence how they learn about the food preferences of others (Tarantola, 
Kumaran, Dayan, & De Martino, 2017). The neural mechanisms of such computations still 
remain to be established.
Social influence on individual preferences and choices
Some of the studies presented above already hint at the tendency that one’s own attitudes are 
influenced by the attitudes of other people. In Garvert et al. (2015), the plasticity observed in 
the mPFC value representation following learning about another person’s values predicted 
changes in participants’ own preferences. In Devaine & Daunizeau (2017), the 
computational model suggests that the degree to which individual preferences align with the 
other agent’s results from an interaction between the social-projection and the social-
influence biases.
Social influence on risk preferences – the extent to which an individual makes a safe versus 
risky decision after observing the behavior of others – has been investigated in two recent 
studies (Chung, Christopoulos, King-Casas, Ball, & Chiu, 2015; Suzuki, Jensen, Bossaerts, 
& O’Doherty, 2016). In the former (Chung et al., 2015), the authors found that observing 
other people’s gambling decisions increased the subjective utility of these gambles for the 
observer. Such ‘other-conferred utility’ was encoded in the vmPFC and the strength of this 
signal predicted the degree of social conformity. In Suzuki et al. (2016), behavioral 
contagion of risk preferences was better explained by a change in subjects’ risk attitudes 
(curvature of the utility function) than by a change in their subjective evaluation of 
probabilities (probability-weighting). Neurally, risk was found to be represented in the 
caudate nucleus, while belief updating about others’ risk preference was encoded in the 
dlPFC. Across individuals, functional connectivity between these two regions was associated 
with the size of the contagion effect.
Collective decisions can also have an influence on individual choice (Charpentier, 
Moutsiana, Garrett, & Sharot, 2014). In this task, groups of five participants make collective 
decisions between pairs of food items, determined by the majority vote, then get to make 
decisions for themselves between these items. Activity in the OFC in response to the initial 
social influence (i.e. the result of the collective decision) was found to be mirrored at a later 
time when the individual chooses their own action. The strength of this mirroring predicted 
the extent to which participants altered their decisions to align with the group.
Not only can other people’s preferences and decisions affect ours, but how confident other 
people are about their decisions should also matter in our own judgment. A recent study 
examined how other people’s confidence is integrated in value computations (Campbell-
Meiklejohn, Simonsen, Frith, & Daw, 2017). Such integration was found to rely on a 
posterior-anterior gradient of activity from the subgenual ACC to the vmPFC to the 
ventromedial Broadmann area 10 (BA 10). More posterior areas (ACC/vmPFC) encoded 
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experiential values as well as values observed from others, while more anterior areas (BA 
10) integrated values computed from other people’s choices weighted by their confidence. 
This mechanism suggests that areas that are located in the most anterior part of the 
prefrontal cortex are able to perform more complex computations underlying social 
influence.
Finally, there is evidence that social conformity – the tendency of people to align their 
behavior with the group – may be computationally implemented as a reinforcement learning 
process. A line of studies suggests that an agent learns about the preferences or opinions of 
another agent or a group by computing the difference between their own judgment and the 
judgment of the group (similar to a prediction error) and integrates social information, 
possibly from several sources, together with individual information (Klucharev et al, 2009; 
Toelch et al, 2013; Huber et al, 2015). According to a recent meta-analysis of functional 
brain imaging studies of social conformity (Wu, Luo, & Feng, 2016), dmPFC responses to 
deviation between individual and group preferences constitute the main signal that predicts 
subsequent conformity to group opinions. In addition, the meta-analysis also points towards 
anterior insula activation and ventral striatum deactivation in response to these deviations, 
although these signals do not seem to be directly linked to preference changes.
Collective decision-making: neural computations involved in reaching a consensus
How people behave in a group, from collaborating or helping each other to reaching a 
consensus on a subjective question, is a key question of social cognition. Several studies 
have developed computational accounts of how these collective behaviors may arise.
In a first study (Suzuki, Adachi, Dunne, Bossaerts, & O’Doherty, 2015), groups of 4 or 6 
participants repeatedly chose between pairs of items until they reach a consensus. This 
means that if they all choose the same item they get it as a reward, but if they disagree they 
have to make a choice again. Therefore, it is crucial that participants in this task incorporate 
their own preferences with the likely choices of other members of the group. The 
computational model predicted that the value assigned to one given item by an individual 
depended on the preference of that individual for the item, the group members’ prior 
choices, as well as on the ‘stickiness’ of the round (i.e. how aggregated the preferences of 
other group members for that item are). Those three components had distinct neural 
representations: personal preferences for items in vmPFC, group members’ prior choices in 
TPJ and pSTS, and stickiness in posterior parietal cortex. Participants’ choices were 
predicted by an integration of these signals in the ACC. Another recent study investigated a 
similar mechanism, namely how individual and social information are integrated during 
group decisions, such as jury decisions for criminals (Park, Goïame, O’Connor, & Dreher, 
2017). Participants appropriately integrated this information and adapted their judgments to 
groups of different sizes in a Bayesian manner. The best-fitting Bayesian inference model 
also revealed that the strength of integration of social information with individual judgment 
depended on its credibility. Activity in the dorsal ACC reflected belief updates predicted by 
the model, while activity in the dlPFC and functional connectivity between the dlPFC and 
dorsal ACC were associated with the credibility of social information in larger groups.
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Several other studies have developed interesting computational models of collective 
decision-making at the behavioral level. These models provide insights into how confidence 
escalate during the collective decision-making process (Mahmoodi, Bang, Ahmadabadi, & 
Bahrami, 2013), how people communicate their confidence to each other in the group (Bang 
et al., 2017) and how they integrate the opinion of group members who differ in their 
competence (Mahmoodi et al., 2015). Interestingly, the latter study revealed an equality bias, 
by which participants assign nearly equal weight to each other’s opinion regardless of 
competence, a result replicated across three cultures. These studies have not used 
neuroimaging to investigate whether the computations predicted by the behavioral models 
are implemented in the brain. They could therefore have important implications for future 
neuroscientific research to help validating the behavioral models and their implementation at 
the neural level, as well as to improve our mechanistic understanding of these key social 
processes.
Finally, the study of collective behavior can also provide interesting evolutionary and 
societal perspectives. Mann & Helbing (2016) recently developed an evolutionary game-
theoretic model of collective prediction to examine the role of incentives in maintaining 
useful diversity. They showed that an incentive scheme that rewards accurate minority 
predictions results in optimal diversity and collective intelligence, in comparison to market-
based incentive systems, which produce herding effects, reduce information available and 
restrain collective intelligence. Such models could have important societal and policy-related 
implications.
Discussion
In this review, we explored studies using a combination of computational modelling of 
behavior with functional neuroimaging to examine learning and decision-making in social 
contexts. Overall, these studies help illustrate some of the core advantages of the 
computational approach relative to more traditional social psychology and neuroscience 
methods. They also point towards some potential pitfalls and issues associated with 
computational modelling, which we discuss below.
Methodological advantages of the computational approach
Traditionally, most social neuroscience studies have used task designs with multiple 
conditions (e.g. 2*2 factorial design), allowing to compare behavior and brain activity 
between two (or more) conditions, and infer underlying processes accordingly. A common 
example in social neuroscience could be comparing performance on a task where the 
participant interacts with another human participant versus with a computer. The inference is 
that brain responses to such a contrast reflects the specific involvement of that network in 
social processes. However, there are two main issues with such a “categorical” approach. 
First, if other factors, such as task difficulty, are not perfectly matched between the two 
conditions being compared, they could be driving differences in brain activity instead of the 
factor of interest. Second, many cognitive processes cannot be defined as simply as a binary 
contrast between conditions (e.g. quantifying the expected reward value of a stimulus, or the 
probability that an observed agent will perform a given action).
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The computational approach, in contrast, allows a much more fine-tuned regression of 
variables of interest against brain activity. By deriving the behavioral computations 
associated with a specific mechanism and examining the neural correlates of these 
computations, this approach overall provides a more mechanistic account of brain function, 
and can offer answers as to how exactly a particular process is implemented in the brain. If 
two competing hypotheses about a particular mechanism make different predictions as to 
what variables should be encoded in the brain, these predictions can be directly tested using 
neurocomputational methods. Finally, such methods are more flexible than traditional 
contrast approaches in the sense that multiple parametric variables can be added to the 
BOLD model at the same time, thus controlling for potential confounds and identifying the 
unique contribution of a variable to the BOLD signal.
Potential issues and pitfalls of neurocomputational methods
A general issue with any computational approach is overfitting (Vandekerckhove, Matzke, & 
Wagenmakers, 2015). If the behavioral or the BOLD models are defined with too many 
parameters or regressors than justified by the data, this can lead to findings that fail to 
replicate or generalize. To avoid this pitfall, it is important to proceed to a rigorous model 
comparison using methods that prevent overfitting, such as out of sample cross-validation, 
penalization of more complex models with Bayesian or Akaike Information Criteria 
(Akaike, 1974; Schwarz, 1978), and Bayesian Model Selection (Stephan, Penny, Daunizeau, 
Moran, & Friston, 2009). Ultimately, it is also key to replicate both behavioral and 
neuroimaging findings in an independent sample.
Second, another potential issue is correlation between model-based regressors. Similar to the 
traditional contrasts approach, it is possible that a particular regressor of interest ends up 
being correlated with another variable, thus leading to misinterpretation of effects of interest. 
To prevent this, it is crucial to examine these potential correlations ahead of time, by 
collecting behavioral pilot data and defining the behavioral models and model-based 
regressors. Just as with more traditional approaches to neuroimaging, it may be necessary to 
structure the experimental design prospectively in such a way so as to minimize the 
correlation between the regressor of interest and confounding variables. If some correlations 
between regressors remain, they have to be controlled for by including both regressors in the 
BOLD model in order to obtain the unique contribution of the regressor of interest.
Finally, a major concern that seem to emerge from this field of research is that most studies, 
as illustrated by those described in this review, examine very specific questions with specific 
task designs and computational models. They report ad-hoc models that are applied uniquely 
to one particular situation or task, thus making generalization very difficult. Moving 
forward, we need a ‘unified’ theory that can be extended and generalized to all sorts of tasks 
and computational problems, at least within the realm of social inference.
Conclusions and benefits for behavioral and social sciences
The studies described in this review provide key insights into how a computational approach 
can inform the behavioral and neural mechanisms by which people learn from and about 
others. We suggest that Bayesian inference models, and their associated neural correlates in 
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the mentalizing network, best explain people’s social learning behavior, especially in 
complex tasks involving strategic or competitive interactions. Simpler computations derived 
from an RL framework may however perform very well in some contexts. Figure 1 provides 
a summary of these strategies and associated neural computations, possibly paving the way 
for a more ‘unified’ theory of the classes of computational strategies involved in social 
learning.
Overall, we suggest that the benefits of a computational approach to social neuroscience 
outweighs its potential pitfalls, not only because of the more refined mechanistic accounts it 
can provide, but also given its ability to inform behavior. Indeed, a particular behavior can at 
times be equally well explained by the computations of two different variables, and model-
based analysis of neuroimaging data can answer the question of which of these variables is 
preferably encoded in the brain, shedding light on the mechanism at play. Focusing on the 
example of observational learning, this neurocomputational approach has allowed 
disentangling specific computations associated with different learning strategies (e.g. 
vicarious reward learning versus action imitation), which could in turn have implications for 
situations or psychiatric conditions where social learning is impaired.
Finally, this review focused on social learning and decision-making, but this computational 
neuroimaging approach has the potential of being applied to other subfields of social 
neuroscience. Some already promising examples include studies of social feedback 
processing (Jones et al., 2011), altruism (Hutcherson, Bushong, & Rangel, 2015), moral 
behavior (Crockett, Kurth-Nelson, Siegel, Dayan, & Dolan, 2014; Crockett, Siegel, Kurth-
Nelson, Dayan, & Dolan, 2017) or social norm enforcement (Zhong, Chark, Hsu, & Chew, 
2016).
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Figure 1. Summary of computational strategies underlying social learning.
oRPE: observational reward prediction error; APE: action prediction error.
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